DAVID R. OBEY, WISCONSIN
CHAIRMAN

House of Representatives
Committee on Appropriations
Washington, DC 20515

3.20.08

TO: NAVY / MC (Posture Hearing)

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April 18, 2008

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Sincerely,

Defense Subcommittee

Posture

SEABASING

Background: The Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)) is the backbone of entirely seabased operations. The Navy envisions this capability as a fleet of 14 ships that will provide pre-positioned equipment for a fly-in force, provide at-sea arrival and assembly of this equipment, direct support of the assault echelon of the task force, indefinite sustainment of the landing force and at-sea reconstitution and redeployment of the landing force. The initial procurement of the ships that comprise the MPF(F) was scheduled to occur in fiscal year 2009 but the Navy has slipped procurements to at least fiscal year 2010 and has removed some of the ships (Auxiliary Dry Cargo Carriers) from its outyear budgets altogether with no plans for procurement.

Questions:

- Admiral Roughead, the plans for acquiring the ships that will comprise the Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future) have changed drastically since last year. Can you summarize the Navy's rationale for this change and the plan for eventually acquiring these ships?
- General Conway, as the user of the Maritime Pre-Positioning Force, how will this impact the Marine Corps and were you included in the decision process to delay ship acquisition?

1 RPTS MCKENZIE

2 DCMN HERZFELD

3 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2009

4 Thursday, March 13, 2008

5 NAVY POSTURE

6 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2009

7 Thursday, March 13, 2008

8 NAVY POSTURE

9 WITNESSES

10 DONALD C. WINTER, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

11 GARY ROUGHEAD, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

12 GENERAL JAMES T. CONWAY, COMMANDANT, MARINE CORPS

13 Mr. MURTHA. The committee will come to order.

14 Let me welcome the three of you to the committee, and
15 compliments on the way you handled the LCS. You got
16 industry's attention. And what we talked about before the
17 hearing is so important to try to work it out so that we can
18 buy one of them, the quantity. And I don't know how hard it
19 is to fit in your budget, but we do the best we can do, but
20 your recommendations make it easier for us.

21 We look forward to hearing your comments about whatever
22 you want to talk about. We are concerned about the Navy
23 because we have got so far behind in shipbuilding, so we
24 would be interested to hear how you are going to proceed.
25 And I expect to overcome or get to 313 ships.

26 Mr. Young.

27 Mr. YOUNG. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am going to forgo an
28 opening statement, but I want to tell a quick story that I
29 think will make everybody in the room feel good.

30 A young soldier donated bone marrow to save the life of
31 a patient through the bone marrow program that we created
32 here. The soldier, after he recovered from that bone marrow
33 extraction, was deployed fairly quickly to Iraq, and he was
34 assigned to a demolition team, to a group of marines. He
35 called us the other night and said, you know, he said, I was
36 out on patrol, he said, we hit a real really scary, difficult
37 situation. He said, I have never, ever seen anybody respond

38 as quickly, as efficiently, as effectively as those marines.
39 And he said that his life's goal now is to finish out his
40 time in the Army and become a marine. He couldn't get beyond
41 telling us how those marines reacted and how just how great
42 they were. He is singing your praises, sir.
43 General CONWAY. Thank you.

44 Mr. WINTER. Chairman Murtha, Congressman Young, members
45 of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear
46 before you today. I am here to present the Department of the
47 Navy's plan to support our sailors and marines in their
48 mission to defend our Nation against current and future
49 challenges. The President's fiscal year 2009 budget will
50 assist the Navy and the Marine Corps in accomplishing their
51 complementary and reinforcing missions, while building
52 capabilities necessary to meet future threats.

53 One of the primary responsibilities of our government is
54 to provide for the Nation's defense. Those responsibilities
55 include the critical requirements to organize, train and
56 equip our naval forces. For the vast majority of citizens,
57 the only cost imposed on us is financial. America is able to
58 provide for the national defense with such a minimal impact
59 on the citizenry because we are blessed to have among us a
60 generation of people, patriots all, who volunteer to serve.
61 They are the ones who bear many hardships, accept many risks
62 and go in harm's way.

63 The pay and benefit funding levels in our 2009 budget
64 reflect the compensation levels necessary to continue to
65 attract and retain quality personnel in the Navy and the
66 Marine Corps. Furthermore, although we are doing well in our
67 overall recruiting and retention numbers, I emphasize the
68 need for special pays and bonuses to meet critical

69 subspecialty needs such as our requirements for nurses,
70 physicians and GWOT-stretched communities, such as explosive
71 ordnance disposal personnel.
72 It is because of the hard work of our sailors and
73 marines that we are making progress, fostering maritime
74 security, defeating terrorist networks, progressing towards a
75 stable Iraq, supporting the Afghan Government, countering
76 piracy and proliferation of deadly technology, rendering
77 humanitarian assistance and strengthening partnerships around
78 the world.
79 Our sailors and marines have responded when called and
80 superbly perform their many missions in our Nation's defense.
81 It is truly an honor and a privilege to work with them and
82 to support them as their Secretary.
83 The Department of the Navy's fiscal year 2009 budget
84 meets the challenge of resourcing the Navy and Marine Corps
85 team across a range of missions from partnership building to
86 combat operations. It invests in our ability to operate,
87 sustain and develop forces that are engaged in the global war
88 on terror while preparing the force for the challenges and
89 threats of the future.
90 We are requesting a total of $149 billion, a 7 percent
91 increase over the fiscal year 2008 baseline. This increase
92 is driven by factors such as rising oil costs and a critical
93 comprehensive growth of the Marine Corps.

94 Our fiscal year 2009 budget reflects three key
95 priorities which are consistent with those of previous years.
96 They are, first of all, to prevail in the global war on
97 terror; secondly, take care of our sailors, marines, their
98 families, and particularly the wounded; and lastly, prepare
99 for future challenges across the full spectrum of operations.
100 To help meet our first priority, prevail in the GWOT, we
101 are adapting our force for current and future missions to
102 include growing the Marine Corps, shaping the force by
103 recruiting and retaining the right people, and addressing
104 critical readiness needs. Among our most critical readiness
105 needs is the ability to train our sailors and marines for the
106 threats that they may encounter.
107 Unfortunately our Navy has encountered increasing
108 encroachments in our ability to conduct critical training.
109 We recognize that there are on occasion impacts on the
110 citizenry at large associated with such training, but these
111 are necessary costs that are critical to the defense of our
112 Nation. We take extensive precautions to minimize the impact
113 of our training.
114 We owe it to the American people, and we owe it to those
115 who serve to acknowledge that as in all things in life, there
116 are competing interests and trade-offs, and that we treat the
117 risks of sonar operation at sea or the impact of jet noise
118 the way we treat all public policy issues, balancing risks

119 and costs against legitimate national security interests. I
120 commit to you today that I will continue to keep you apprised
121 of legal challenges and their implications for readiness that
122 we face over the course of the coming year.

123 Mr. Chairman, if in the future we are unable to properly
124 train our sailors and marines, we will have failed to do our
125 duty to them and to the American people.

126 Another critical issue I would like to highlight
127 concerns doing right by those who go in harm's way. As
128 Secretary of Defense Gates has stated, apart from the war
129 itself, we have no higher priority than to take care of our
130 wounded. Our wounded warriors and their families deserve the
131 highest-priority care, respect and treatment for their
132 sacrifices. Our 2009 budget honors our commitment to ensure
133 that our sailors and marines receive the appropriate care,
134 training and financial support that they need.

135 Finally, to meet the challenges of the future, the 2009
136 budget provides for a balanced fleet of ships, aircraft and
137 expeditionary capabilities with the fighting power and
138 versatility to carry out blue-, green- and brownwater
139 missions wherever called upon. Furthermore, I would like to
140 note that consistent with our commitment to ensure
141 affordability and timely delivery of capabilities, we have
142 launched an acquisition improvement initiative to provide
143 better integration of requirements and acquisition decision

144 processes; improve governance and insight into the
145 development, establishment and execution of acquisition
146 programs; and formalize the framework to engage senior naval
147 leadership.
148 Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the strong support this
149 committee and the Congress at large has given our Navy and
150 Marine Corps team. I want to thank you on their behalf. Our
151 Navy and Marine Corps is a strong, capable and dedicated
152 team. I appreciate the opportunity to represent them here
153 today, and I look forward to your questions.
154 [The information follows:]

155 ******** INSERT 1-1 ********

156 Mr. MURTHA. Admiral Roughead.

157 Admiral ROUGHEAD. Chairman Murtha, Congressman Young,
158 distinguished members of the committee, on behalf of our
159 600,000 sailors, civilians and families, I appear before you
160 today.

161 Together with Secretary Winter and General Conway, I am
162 privileged to be a part of the leadership team that is
163 committed to our Nation's safety, security and prosperity.
164 Today our Navy stands ready with the agility, the flexibility
165 and the confidence to do what no other navy in the world can
166 do. Four weeks ago we successfully and temporarily converted
167 a portion of our sea-based ballistic missile defense program
168 to engage a failing satellite.

169 Sea-based ballistic missile defense is here, it is real,
170 and it works. But that is only part of what your Navy does
171 for the Nation. We are exercising our new maritime strategy
172 every day, a strategy that is far more than just a glossy
173 brochure. Our carriers are projecting power in the Arabian
174 Gulf, our destroyers are demonstrating our resolve in the
175 Mediterranean, an amphibious ship is engaged in piracy
176 operations on the east coast of Africa, and another is
177 delivering humanitarian assistance to the west coast of
178 Africa. Our frigates are intercepting drug traffickers in
179 the Caribbean Sea, our Riverine forces are patrolling vital
180 infrastructure on the Euphrates River in Iraq, and our

181 submarines patrol silently around the globe.

182 We have 118 ships and over 58,000 people on deployment
183 out and about doing the work of the Nation. But as you so
184 well know, our operations come at a cost to our people, our
185 current readiness and the future fleet, and those are my
186 three priorities. Our people, our sailors, our marines and
187 their families know they have your support. We must continue
188 to invest in their futures and in the young men and women of
189 America who will follow in their wake.

190 In the context of this generational war, it is
191 imperative that we continue to care for our wounded warriors
192 and support the health care needs of all of our sailors and
193 Navy civilians. Likewise, your support for the critical
194 skills reenlistment bonuses has enabled us to retain the
195 sailors that we need.

196 Supporting our future force cannot be done without
197 readiness to fight today. To this end, quality shore
198 installations, responsive depot-level maintenance facilities
199 and unfettered ability to train responsively are necessities.
200 Where area access and shore support is denied, the
201 Commandant and I have been moving forward together with the
202 sea-basing alternative. These elements are essential to
203 support our fleet response plan, which has enabled us to meet
204 requirements and will sustain us through the requested
205 temporary carrier force level adjustment.

206 Of my three focus areas, building tomorrow's Navy to be
207 a balanced, appropriately sized force is the most immediate
208 imperative and challenge. Fiscal realities, however, have
209 led us to assume more risk in shipbuilding, ship operations
210 and weapons. Achieving the 313-ship floor at current funding
211 levels will require us to improve processes, collaborate with
212 industry and make difficult decisions in the near term.
213 I am pleased that the first two DDG 1000 contracts have
214 been awarded. Our surface combatants are an essential
215 element of our force, and it is important that we do not
216 deplete the combatant line as we build toward 313 ships.
217 I remain strongly committed to funding those programs
218 that provide critical capabilities to our forces. There is
219 no substitute for the littoral combat ship in closing the
220 littoral capability gap. Current F/A-18 Hornets are needed
221 to assuage a 2016 strikefighter shortfall. Surface combatant
222 superiority will be maintained through DDG-51 modernization.
223 Multimission maritime aircraft will recapitalize our maritime
224 patrol antisubmarine warfare capabilities, and sea-based
225 ballistic missile defense will ensure future theater and
226 national defense and enable access for our joint forces.
227 These critical programs for our future fleet require
228 appropriate disciplined investment now. The 2009 budget and
229 its associated force structure plans will meet our current
230 challenges with a moderate degree of risk. Clearly we have

231 many challenges of which building tomorrow's fleet is the
232 greatest, but with these challenges it is our opportunity to
233 have a balanced and global fleet which will defend the Nation
234 and assure our prosperity for generations to come.
235 On behalf of our sailors, our Navy civilians and our
236 families, thank you again for the opportunity to appear
237 before you and for all the support for our Navy today and our
238 Navy of tomorrow. I look forward to your questions.
239 Mr. MURTHA. Thank you.
240 [The information follows:]

241 ******** INSERT 1-2 ********

242 General CONWAY. Chairman Murtha, Congressman Young and
243 distinguished members of the committee, I pledge to always
244 provide you with forthright and honest assessments of your
245 Marine Corps. I bear that in mind as I come to report to you
246 on the posture today of our service.
247 In our written statement, I provided you a list of
248 priorities that would enable your Corps to best serve our
249 Nation's security interests both today and in the uncertain
250 future. But, in brief, our young warriors in combat are my
251 number one priority. Those magnificent patriots have been
252 extremely effective in disrupting insurgents and the al Qaeda
253 in the al-Anbar Province.
254 In the spirit of jointness, I must note that it is not
255 just marines; rather marines, sailors and soldiers are
256 composite over time that has brought success in the al-Anbar.
257 Your marines are still supporting the surge in Iraq where we
258 have already shifted from population to protection to
259 transitioning security responsibilities to Iraqi security
260 forces, and they are actively stepping up to the task.
261 In answer to the most recent call from the Secretary of
262 Defense, we are also deploying more than 3,400 marines to
263 Afghanistan. Your marines will assist a joint force in
264 either gaining or maintaining momentum there. We fall in on
265 our expeditionary ethos of living hard and fighting well as
266 part of an air-ground team. This deployment will keep us at

267 surge levels well into October.

268 I have just returned from a visit to Iraq and
269 Afghanistan, and, ladies and gentlemen, I am pleased to
270 report to you that your marines are demonstrating an amazing
271 resiliency in the face of multiple deployments to dangerous
272 lands. In spite of one-to-one deployment-to-dwell regimen
273 that has virtually no chance of getting better until the
274 fall, the factors that we track monthly to determine the
275 health of the force, and those include desertion and UA
276 rates, suicide, divorce, child or spousal abuse and
277 reenlistment rates, are all as good or better than they were
278 in 2001.

279 We do have a significant issue with our families.
280 Simply put, they are proud of their contributions to this
281 war, but they are tired. We owe it to those families to put
282 our family service programs onto a wartime footing. For too
283 long our programs have been borne on the backs of volunteers,
284 perhaps acceptable during peacetime, but untenable during a
285 protracted conflict. The Congress has been exceptionally
286 supportive, enabling us to make good on promises to do more.

287 Of course, we look well beyond today in our obligation
288 to the Nation, and we have learned lessons of trying to build
289 the force as we fight. In our response to a clear need, we
290 are growing the Corps to 202,000 marines. We do this without
291 lowering our standards, and we are ahead of our goals.

292 During the last fiscal year, we needed to bring aboard 5,000
293 additional recruits. We actually grew 7,000 additional
294 marines, 96.2 percent of them high school graduates.
295 But more than just manpower, this growth requires
296 training, infrastructure and equipment to meet the needs of
297 our Nation. You have helped us meet those requirements with
298 steady support and encouragement, and for that we certainly
299 thank you.
300 The Marine Corps retains the mission to provide the
301 multicapable force for our Nation, a two-fisted fighter, if
302 you will, able to destroy enemy formations with our
303 air-ground team in a major contingency, but also able to fall
304 back on our hard-earned irregular warfare skills honed over
305 decades of conflict. By far the most complex of our
306 congressionally mandated missions, amphibious operations
307 require deliberate training and long-term resourcing to
308 achieve a high level of proficiency. The operational
309 expertise, special equipment sets and amphibious lift are not
310 capabilities that we can rapidly provide in the face of a
311 threat.
312 Finally, on behalf of your marines, I extend great
313 appreciation for your support thus far, and I thank you in
314 advance for those efforts on behalf of your brave servicemen
315 and women in harm's way. I assure you that the Marine Corps
316 appreciates the increasing competition for the Nation's

317 discretionary resources and will continue to provide a
318 tangible return on every dollar spent. Thank you, Mr.
319 Chairman, for the opportunity to comment.
320 Mr. MURTHA. Thank you very much.
321 [The information follows:]

322 ******** INSERT 1-3 ********

323 Mr. MURTHA. Let me start out by saying that, you know,
324 it is one thing to talk about how we support the families.
325 We have put $400 million, this subcommittee did, last year.
326 The Defense Department cut that back to $240 million. I
327 mean, that doesn't look like it is supporting the families
328 the way we think they should be supported. They have
329 inadequate facilities in many places, they have inadequate
330 counseling in many places. We do the best we can between
331 this subcommittee and the members of this subcommittee, we
332 try to make sure--we know how important the families are to
333 the Members themselves that are serving overseas. And it is
334 discouraging when the Iraqis aren't stepping up putting their
335 money in, the Europeans are not stepping up putting their
336 money in. And the United States taxpayer keeps putting more
337 money into these--$343 million a day.
338 But infrastructure is something we are going to try to
339 do a little bit more for, medical infrastructure, this year.
340 We are going to transfer money to the Military Construction
341 Subcommittee; also for just regular infrastructure. But the
342 shortages that we see and that you are talking about have to
343 be taken care of. But we hope we will be able to get started
344 in that direction this year. We see a change in direction.
345 We want to look past Iraq into the future because the--there
346 is nobody more than the Navy that prevents a war. You can
347 deploy quickly, you can deploy to an area where they

348 understand the might and military impact of the United
349 States. And with the equipment the shape that it is in, it
350 is going to be more difficult.
351 For instance, I don't even need to ask you if we can get
352 to 313 ships at the numbers that the administration is
353 sending over because it can't be done. And so we are going
354 to add some ships, or at least we are going to recommend to
355 the subcommittee that we will add some ships, to what you
356 folks have been able to--what OMB has been able to let you
357 recommend to the committee.
358 But let me ask you a question, Commandant. How long
359 does it take to you train somebody for amphibious warfare?
360 What would you say if you stop training from the current type
361 training you are doing and you start training for amphibious
362 warfare, the conventional-type operations?
363 General CONWAY. Sir, the issue is training certainly.
364 But the larger issue is trainers, for years, and my coming up
365 through the Corps, we always had this cadre of people who are
366 very well experienced in amphibious operations, kind of the
367 old hands who had been ship's company and had done multiple
368 operations or exercises. Those folks are steadily leaving
369 us. And we are not creating that cadre of trainers behind
370 them. So that is my larger concern.
371 It has been 4 years now since we have done major
372 amphibious exercises. I think it will be at least 4 years

373 before we can gain back some of that level of expertise and
374 get to a level of comfort to the point where that once again
375 becomes a core competency. And I may be optimistic thinking
376 that it is a one-for-one exchange. It may be worse than
377 that.

378 Mr. MURTHA. This is a problem that we have when we are
379 training for this type of warfare and yet looking ahead
380 trying to get past. So one of the things that I worry about,
381 repairing equipment, nobody has done more than this committee
382 trying to put in enough money for reset and rehabilitation.
383 While I am looking ahead, I am thinking to myself, if we
384 don't start buying new equipment, if we don't start getting
385 past this and buying the new equipment, we will never get to
386 the point where we need to get where we have less maintenance
387 costs, less fuel costs.

388 The Army came to this committee about the FCS. Well, I
389 have always been worried about FCS because it is $160
390 billion, and I don't see how we will get there. Well, they
391 are trying to come up with a way they can cut back on some of
392 the reset and get to the newer equipment, which reduces
393 maintenance costs, reduces fuel costs. One of the proposals
394 we have had is jump right over the destroyers that go to the
395 cruisers which would be nuclear power. Yet it is impossible
396 to get there, from what I understand, just because of the
397 ship--the need to have an industrial base. In fact, we

398 wouldn't have any ships in some of the shipyards. Is that a
399 possibility at all?
400 Mr. WINTER. Mr. Chairman, there are several aspects
401 associated with the ongoing DDG 1000 program. First of all,
402 it is a very different ship than what we envision for the
403 cruiser. It is the one mechanism of providing naval surface
404 fire support to the marines. And it is an ongoing activity
405 that is very, I think, well planned and well established and
406 critical to maintain in terms of ensuring that the industrial
407 base is able to continue to evolve. At the same time, we
408 need to make sure that we set the right groundwork for the
409 cruiser development in the future.
410 We are still going through the analysis of alternatives
411 associated with the CG(X) program. I think the process is a
412 good one. I think the right questions are being asked. We
413 also need to make sure that we take the time to answer those
414 questions before we just run right into the development of
415 that program, sir.
416 Mr. MURTHA. I hear two stories. One is that the
417 nuclear-powered cruiser will save us a lot of money in fuel
418 costs, and yet the up-front costs are so much, it would take
419 25 or 30 years to make up for that initial cost. Is that
420 accurate?
421 Mr. WINTER. Well, sir, I think there is still a
422 question as to what the break-even point would be. That is

423 highly dependent on the cost of oil, and numbers have been
424 bandied about from everything from $100-a-barrel oil, which
425 is basically where we are right now, to $300 a barrel of oil,
426 depending upon what you see is the future. And I can get
427 estimates all over the map. Depending on who I talk to, you
428 will get different break-even points.

429 The other issue is that in the commercial world, I could
430 go out in my old life and borrow money to be able to
431 accommodate a cost savings in the future. We can't quite do
432 that here. And so the additional costs associated with
433 nuclear power for any of our surface combatants would come at
434 the expense of other top line.

435 One other point I would make is that we know how to deal
436 with nuclear power. We have got a tremendous track record,
437 and, in fact, at this point in time, roughly half of the
438 reactors operational in the United States are operated by the
439 Navy. At the same time, I will tell you it takes a while to
440 configure a reactor plant for a vessel, and it does provide
441 some significant constraints. It is a lot easier to put a
442 nuclear reactor in a large ship like a carrier than it is to
443 be able to do it in a more volumetrically challenged vessel
444 like a destroyer or a cruiser.

445 Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Young.

446 Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

447 Chairman Murtha in his statement and one of his

448 questions emphasized the importance of the Navy, and there is
449 no doubt the importance of the Navy not only to Navy and the
450 sailors, but the marines onboard the ships. And the mission
451 of those ships is extremely important. But protecting those
452 ships so they can perform the mission and protecting the
453 crews onboard the ships is important.

454 Brings me to the subject of training. We have seen
455 times in recent times where we lost the training areas in
456 Vieques, for example; we have lost bombing ranges for one
457 reason or another. And now we are about to lose training
458 areas for sonar; sonar which is very, very important to
459 protecting the ships to do their mission and to protect the
460 troops onboard.

461 You had an appeal to the Federal appeals court recently.
462 Your appeal was rejected. I assume that you are not going
463 to give up without a little more of a fight, considering the
464 importance of sonar training to the protection of our Navy.

465 Mr. WINTER. Sir, I fully anticipate that we will be
466 submitting a brief shortly for the Supreme Court to appeal
467 the matter at hand associated with the southern California
468 operating area.

469 Mr. YOUNG. Who will handle that? Will the Navy handle
470 that, or will the executive branch--

471 Mr. WINTER. Department of Justice has the official
472 responsibility for the actual matters. We have a dedicated

473 team within the Department of the Navy within the General
474 Counsel Office, supported by the JAG Corps and the
475 operational Navy staff, providing the technical support to
476 that activity.

477 Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Secretary, what will be the impact if
478 you lose that appeal?

479 Mr. WINTER. I think that the impact could be very
480 significant in terms of providing a series of constraints on
481 our ability to train. Sonar is, I believe you know, and I
482 would like to make sure everyone else does understand--is a
483 phenomenology that in Iraq's, if you will, environment, sonar
484 operation depends upon where you are, what the water column
485 looks like, what the seabed looks like. And training of the
486 fleet needs to occur in areas that mimic, if you will, the
487 operating areas that we expect to be encountering in our
488 future. Without the ability to fully engage in that
489 training, I think we would be hard pressed to argue that our
490 fleet was prepared to deal with the future threat.

491 I would also note that the training activities that we
492 engage in take place over extended periods of time. It is
493 not just a matter of turning on a sonar, getting a quick
494 reading and deciding that you have got something worked. The
495 engagement between the submarine force and the surface force
496 that is trying to deal with it takes place over a long period
497 of time. The interruption of that training, even if a whale

498 or other marine mammal is seen at a great distance, can have
499 a significant impact on the integrity of that training
500 exercise.

501 And so we have a lot of concerns. We believe we have
502 put forth a very good program right now. We have a series of
503 29 mitigation measures that we have operationally employed
504 now for several years, and these measures call for
505 surveillance of the test area, continuing observation,
506 looking for marine mammals, and a very studied approach of
507 reducing power, and, if necessary, turning off the exercise
508 if a marine mammal gets too close. That approach, that set
509 of mitigation measures, has proven to be very effective, and
510 we have not had a single documented case of injury or death
511 to a marine mammal since those measures have been put into
512 place. To further build upon those and to keep on
513 constraining the test regime further and further, which seems
514 to be an approach desired by some out there, I think would
515 hurt us significantly. And I ask CNO to comment.

516 Admiral ROUGHEAD. The challenges that are being posed
517 by new designs of submarines are significant. They are
518 becoming quieter, they are getting smaller, they do not have
519 to come up and recharge their batteries as often as
520 submarines in the past have had to do. They are difficult
521 targets. And they are also proliferating at a significant
522 rate.

523 We estimate that in the next two decades the submarine
524 inventory in the world will increase by 50 percent, and that
525 poses a challenge to the sea lanes of the world. We must be
526 able to practice. We must be able to train. But we also
527 have to be able to train in those areas that allow us to not
528 only practice our antisubmarine warfare skill, because an
529 adversary is going to throw everything they can at us--they
530 are going to throw our submarines at us, they are going to
531 attack us with cruise missiles, with airplanes, with other
532 ships, and that is why we have to be in areas where we can
533 bring all of those types of challenges to our sailors so that
534 they know what it is going to be like, and that they are
535 properly prepared, that they know how to use their equipment,
536 and that they are going to win.
537 Mr. YOUNG. Recently Captain Carney took me to visit
538 where you train sea mammals to do some pretty exciting and
539 pretty important missions for the Navy. And some of the
540 scientists that we met with--and I asked the question, what
541 is the effect of sonar on the whales or the other sea
542 mammals? Their response, and they seemed to be in agreement,
543 was that if it is uncomfortable for the whale to be in the
544 area where the sonar is being exercised, he leaves. That
545 seemed like a pretty simple answer to me. And, you know,
546 these were scientists. I assume that they know what they are
547 talking about. But I certainly hope that you succeed, and

548 that we are not denied, because the as the Admiral just
549 mentioned this, how serious this threat could be, and we all
550 know about the Chinese submarine that recently trailed some
551 of our Navy vessels undetected. So I hope that you are
552 successful in that appeal to the Supreme Court.

553 Mr. Chair, if I could ask a general question about the
554 Afghanistan deployment. NATO has said that we need about
555 7,000 additional troops in NATO. You are going to send 3,200
556 marines, which is going to, according to your own statement,
557 stretch you really thin. What do we know about whether or
558 not NATO is going to actually step up and provide the
559 additional 3,500 to 4,000 additional troops that we feel that
560 we need there?

561 General CONWAY. Sir, I can only say, it is my
562 perspective that that is not a closed chapter yet. I know
563 that the Secretary and the Chairman attend frequent quarterly
564 discussions with our NATO partners and allies, and it is the
565 topic virtually on every occasion. So they continue to
566 encourage them, if they can't provide maneuver battalions,
567 provide police trainers, provide PRTs or provide soft kinds
568 of power that the Afghan Government needs to become more
569 effective in what it does for the people. So they continue
570 to pound their drum, sir. I think I can fairly well assure
571 you.

572 Mr. YOUNG. Well, it seems like NATO is not really

573 stepping up as they should. Hopefully we can find some way
574 to impress upon them the importance of not being undermanned
575 there and so that we can have a successful conclusion.
576 Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
577 Mr. MURTHA. One of the things I just wanted you to send
578 for the record, I want to know what a CR would mean to you,
579 because I am not sure we are going to have a bill this year
580 just because of the problems that we have in both bodies. So
581 send me a document that shows what would happen if we had a
582 CR rather than a base bill this year. We will have a 2008
583 supplement, but I am not sure we will have anything but a CR
584 to get us through the rest of the year.
585 Second is I would like to have the number of contractors
586 that the Navy has by category. I need to know whether
587 security people, whether there are service people, foreign
588 nationals and so forth. The Army is going to send me the
589 same kind of list. So I would appreciate it if you would
590 send us that list so we can find out. I was disappointed to
591 hear that Secretary of the Army had 190,000 contractors in
592 Iraq and Afghanistan. And I asked him the categories so we
593 could see exactly what he is talking about. I know we need
594 contractors. Do you have something?
595 Mr. WINTER. Sir, just as a point of clarification, if I
596 could ask, you are talking about contractors in theater?
597 Mr. MURTHA. In theater, yes.

598 Mr. WINTER. In theater. Thank you, sir. I would be
599 happy to provide that.
600 Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Moran.
601 Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That was a
602 provocative question there.
603 I have got a couple of questions, but first I want to
604 make a little observation, particularly to you, General
605 Conway. So my nephew Kevin pulls a Jack Murtha, and he drops
606 out of college so he can join the Marines, so he can fight in
607 Iraq. So he finishes up Parris Island, and he is all set.
608 You know, he is a football player-type guy, he is really
609 gung-ho. And the Marine Corps says, sorry, you have to go
610 into financial management training. We need all you smart
611 guys to be going into financial management. He says,
612 financial management? I want to go fight in Iraq. He says,
613 well--he says, why financial management? They said, well,
614 the Congress is saying that we don't have enough control over
615 our spending, so we need to get more people in financial
616 management. So I blamed it on Norm Dicks.
617 I do want to ask you about--oh, about recruiting and
618 retention, because there aren't a lot of Jack Murthas around,
619 quite frankly, and as a result you are having to spend about
620 $300 million on bonuses; $60,000 for specialty needs. How
621 are you doing on meeting those specialty occupational
622 categories that you so desperately need?

623 General CONWAY. Sir, we have been doing very well. We
624 have been very pleased with our ability at a time in the
625 country where the propensity on the part of all three major
626 ethnic groups is not to join the military. We have been
627 pleased with the ability of our recruiters to get out and to
628 get into the schools and bring in the numbers that we need.
629 As I mentioned in my opening statement, we thought we could
630 keep the standards high and do about 5,000 a year after
631 adding about 300 recruiters to the field and some use of
632 bonuses, but not large numbers of bonuses, let's say, for
633 enlistment. We apply bonuses more for reenlistment really
634 than we do for initial entry. We have been able to manage
635 all the fields pretty effectively.
636 And to your sort of vignette, sir, our recruiters tell
637 us if they had all just infantry MOSs, they could close out
638 by about the 10th of every month. That is the threat of
639 great young Americans out there that want to fight for their
640 country, if that is what the country is doing. We have a
641 program, by the way, that tries to get every marine into the
642 fight. So if your nephew will be patient with us, there is
643 every possibility or maybe probability we will get him where
644 he wants to go.
645 Mr. MURTHA. Would the gentleman yield?
646 Mr. MORAN. Yes, sir.
647 Mr. MURTHA. Can you do without these bonuses? I

648 joined, my three brothers joined, my dad and his brother
649 joined. Can we do without these bonuses? Can't we rely on
650 patriotism to get these guys in?
651 General CONWAY. Sir, if I had to separate out the
652 services, and I don't like to do that because there is, I
653 think, a necessary inflection, that is what we do. We don't
654 offer a $40,000 college loan or a small business loan when
655 you get out. The bonus that an average marine takes is
656 probably on the order of $3,000 to $5,000. And what we sell
657 is the fact that you are going to be a United States marine.
658 You are going to go fight for your country, and you are going
659 to be a marine for life.
660 Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, Kevin didn't get a penny. And
661 he doesn't know of any--his father could have used it. Okay.
662 I have got another question here.
663 This is a little more serious, so we are going to ask
664 Secretary Winter about the Joint Strike Fighter. Investment
665 now approaches about a trillion dollars, awful lot of planes,
666 and we are told that the total acquisition cost increased by
667 more than $23 billion because of higher procurement costs.
668 The GAO states that $288 billion for acquisition is
669 unreliable because it is insufficiently documented. And then
670 the GAO found that three independent defense offices
671 separately concluded that program cost estimates are
672 understated by as much as $38 billion, and that the schedule

673 is going to slip from at least a year to more than 2 years.
674 You know, if we are spending nearly $1 trillion on the
675 development and procurement of an aircraft, we have got to
676 make sure that it meets our needs. And you really have to
677 wonder what is such a substantial challenge that is going to
678 face us in the near future for dominance of the airspace? We
679 have got it. Nobody has any interest in trying to contest us
680 for dominance of the airspace. And the GAO tells us that 90
681 percent of the acquisition program is still ahead of us. I
682 mean, we are talking about an enormous amount of money.
683 Why do we need to be investing so much in an aircraft
684 that really seems to be more about winning the last war, the
685 Cold War, than dealing with the current threats to America's
686 security by people and groups that are never going to have
687 any jet fighters, even bombers, to contest air sovereignty?
688 Do you want to handle that?
689 Mr. WINTER. I will take a crack at it, Congressman.
690 First of all, I will suggest that the JSF program, the
691 F-35 program, is designed to provide us with a broad spectrum
692 of air support capabilities that deal with the current
693 engagement as well as any of the engagements that we are
694 looking at in the future. The value of tactical air is
695 something that has been proven time and time again, and for
696 the most part, it relates to being able to control the air,
697 but also to be able to project power from the air to the

698 ground in support of ground forces or naval forces that are
699 within the area of responsibility.
700 JSF is an overlay program, if you will. It has three
701 separate components. It supports the STOVL, the short
702 takeoff and vertical landing capability, that is critical to
703 the Marine Corps. Right now four are big deck amphibs. We
704 really have only one class of aircraft that is capable of
705 flying off of them. That is the Harrier. That is a very old
706 aircraft. It is in great need of replacement, and it is the
707 core of our ability to provide support to our embarked
708 marines and any future amphibious operation that they engage
709 in.
710 Similarly, the future for the Navy, the carrier variant
711 is the mechanism of providing future capabilities that will
712 span the spectrum of threats that we have to deal with for
713 naval aviation, to be able to project power from the sea or
714 to be able to deal with threats at the sea. A lot of the
715 program is still ahead of us because we are still in the
716 process of development.
717 We have established a program here of fly before you
718 buy. We are going through a detailed evaluation and
719 development activity to ensure that we have what we need. We
720 are not going to place orders for any of these aircraft for
721 production purposes until such time as we have had sufficient
722 flight test evaluation. That is coming up here very shortly.

723 We expect to see the STOVL first flight coming up here this
724 year, later this year, and I think that that will be a good
725 milestone at which point we will be able to evaluate where we
726 are in terms of the overall development process and where we
727 think we will be in terms of the future cost estimates.
728 Mr. MORAN. It is a great answer. That is what you are
729 supposed to tell us. But, you know, the Navy and Marine
730 Corps are absolutely essential, are always going to be
731 absolutely essential, but we are getting to the point where
732 this is kind of a zero-sum game. When you put a trillion
733 dollars into the J-35, you are taking it from someplace else.
734 And I really question 2,500 jet fighters at a trillion
735 dollars is the best possible use of an enormous amount of
736 resources that might otherwise go into other needs to address
737 the real current kind of threat we face. But that is just a
738 comment, and I appreciate the answer. There is nothing wrong
739 with the answer, but I am not sure there isn't wrong with
740 some of the policies.
741 Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Frelinghuysen.
742 Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
743 Gentlemen, good morning. Thank you for your service,
744 and those of you that look after in Iraq and Afghanistan and
745 around the world, and certainly to those who serve in the
746 Navy doing in their military occupations things they weren't
747 trained to do specifically, guarding those convoys and at

748 time probably prisoners, all sorts of things that are pretty
749 key and important to us.
750 One of the ways to discuss posture, which is sort of the
751 focus of this hearing, is to talk about what other nations
752 are doing. And I think quite a lot we focus on the build-up
753 of what is happening in China. I think maybe less attention
754 is focused on Russia. You are familiar, Admiral, with--you
755 know the incident in late 2006 of the Navy--Chinese Navy
756 apparently stalking the Kitty Hawk and putting up a submarine
757 within firing distance without supposedly being detected. I
758 assume that sub was a diesel. Do they have nuclear subs?
759 Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir, they do.
760 Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I assume it was a diesel sub.
761 Then we read last November of a Chinese Song-class
762 submarine tracking the Kitty Hawk in the Taiwan Straits. It
763 was monitored by an antisubmarine aircraft watching the sub,
764 and, of course, it was described in the paper as, I quote,
765 the first direct military confrontation between the two
766 nations' naval forces since 1996.
767 Besides the obvious build-up of concern about the
768 obvious build-up of Chinese forces, what can you tell us
769 about these incidents as they relate to the--sort of the
770 tactics and strategies that you are looking at? How do we
771 posture ourselves, given these and other types of incidents?
772 Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. And I was the Pacific

773 Fleet Commander at the time, and on the last incident that
774 you mentioned, I questioned the credibility of that news
775 report.

776 But what we have done in recent years is we have looked
777 at the posture that we must have, particularly in the
778 Pacific, because the Pacific is a very important region for
779 us from a security standpoint, the allies that we have there,
780 but also economically, and it contributes directly to our
781 prosperity. We have shifted our carrier force so now we are
782 biased more toward the Pacific. We have done the same thing
783 with our submarines. We have forward home-ported some of our
784 submarines in Guam so that we have more presence, greater
785 response in the Pacific area. We continue to exercise with
786 our allies and partners in that region, and antisubmarine
787 warfare is extremely important. That is why the training is
788 so important.

789 But it is also key to recall that in some cases
790 countries are able to export some of these systems, and so to
791 simply look at one particular flag and see that as a
792 potential threat, I think it has to be broadened out. Where
793 are some of these systems, advanced systems, finding their
794 way? And that is important to do as well.

795 Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But by all reports, you know,
796 obviously we have repositioned ourselves. But, you know, I
797 assume some people must be alarmed by the talk of the

798 Chinese, you know, producing, you know, a goal of 200
799 submarines. I am not sure what the figure was in terms of
800 surface vessels. And they do a pretty good job of--for their
801 own technological development. And what they don't get there
802 I assume they steal from us or get from other sources.
803 I mean, in terms of sort of sounding the alarm here, you
804 know, while we talk about the size of the fleet, and we know
805 how expensive it is to bring new ships on line, are you
806 concerned about their build-up? I know we always go with the
807 old issue of, you know, overwhelming force, and we are--you
808 know, our capabilities are better. But the Chinese are no
809 slouches. And, you know, there is often talk of, you know,
810 2015. But Chinese aren't waiting to 2015. How do you gauge
811 where the Chinese are going, and how closely are we keeping
812 an eye on their development of new technology as well as the
813 vehicles that carry them?
814 Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, we watch naval developments
815 around the world, and clearly China is the Navy that is
816 increasing in capability and capacity faster than any other
817 navy on the globe. There is no question in my mind, and I
818 have had the opportunity to meet with their leadership, with
819 my counterpart, on a couple of occasions, that there is no
820 question that they are developing what we refer to as a
821 bluewater navy, a navy that can range farther from their
822 shores. They also have a much longer view than others have.

823 Their objective is to become a significant regional navy.

824 There is no question that the issue of Taiwan is always
825 first and foremost in their mind, but as you look at the
826 development of the navy, it is also a navy that is focused on
827 the sea lanes of communication and being able to assure the
828 flows that fuel their growing economy. So they are doing
829 that.

830 But in addition to the hardware, it is also important
831 that we look at the people, and my first contacts with the
832 PLA Navy, the leadership tended to have gotten into their
833 positions through political means. The leadership in the PLA
834 Navy today came up through operational paths. They
835 understand what it is like to operate a navy at sea, and they
836 see this vision of their navy as a significant regional navy
837 and, I believe, expanding out and becoming global as time
838 goes on.

839 Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The view is, at least from my
840 reading, is that there--what it may have been described as
841 somewhat political once, you would never call it amateurish,
842 is that they are doing--you know, they are sort of
843 concentrating their development of their military in a very
844 highly professional manner. I mean, it may not be mirroring
845 our Special Forces or, you know, your SEALs, but in reality
846 they are emulating the best of what is out there, and we need
847 to be prepared for it.

848 Just on one system here, could you comment about the
849 drone combat squadron, who is--the whole issue of your
850 seeking, I think, a competitive prototyping in preparation of
851 fielding a first squadron of unmanned combat aerial vehicles.
852 Are those carrier-based?
853 Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. That is part of a--kind of
854 what I would call a family of unmanned vehicles beginning
855 with--
856 Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You have things going off carriers
857 now?
858 Admiral ROUGHEAD. No, sir, we are not flying unmanned
859 vehicles off of our carriers. We are flying unmanned
860 vehicles off of some of our ships, but the article that you
861 reference is moving to an air combat vehicle, one that can
862 provide striking power off the carriers, and it is part of a
863 stepped and phased development.
864 Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. That is in some ways pretty
865 revolutionary given the fact that, you know, obviously the
866 whole issue of a man behind the controls, not that there
867 aren't men behind these controls, but one could view that as
868 somewhat of a major departure.
869 Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, I think, sir--
870 Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Perhaps a positive departure.
871 Admiral ROUGHEAD. The significant thing is being able
872 to operate those airplanes, combat airplanes, off of an

873 aircraft carrier in an unmanned way. Our other unmanned
874 programs address other needs that we have in maritime
875 surveillance. But this is something that is fairly complex;
876 landing on an aircraft carrier, taking off can get pretty
877 sporty, and we have never done it with an unmanned vehicle
878 before. That is why we are--it has a little longer view than
879 some of the other unmanned programs that we have.
880 Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
881 Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Frelinghuysen, did you get a bonus when
882 you went into the Army?
883 Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I sure didn't.
884 Mr. MURTHA. Look where he has ended up, huh?
885 Mr. MORAN. This is a random sample.
886 Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am glad you are leaving.
887 Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kaptur.
888 Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome. Thank
889 you for coming today.
890 Admiral Roughead, I would like to ask you a question
891 about the structure of the Chinese shipbuilding industry. To
892 what extent does the Government of China subsidize the
893 manufacturing of and construction of ships there? And have
894 you looked at that issue?
895 Admiral ROUGHEAD. I have not done the economic
896 analysis, but my sense is it is heavily subsidized.
897 Ms. KAPTUR. Is it really not an arm of the state

898 and--of their government?

899 Admiral ROUGHEAD. I would say that they are state
900 industries with a view toward becoming a dominant
901 shipbuilding industry in the world.

902 Ms. KAPTUR. I agree with that. And the question I
903 have, coming from a maritime community that has suffered
904 greatly over the years with the loss of both hardware as well
905 as the people who make the ships, though we are not a
906 deepwater port, what do we do in your budget to capture every
907 single dollar we can, knowing that they are the primary
908 producers in the world today, correct? The work that was
909 being done in Korea is now moving up to China. I think if
910 you look at the shifting nature of shipbuilding in the world,
911 what do we do with your budget and every element of it,
912 leasing, the leasing you are now doing, phasing that out?
913 How can we possibly compete with these private companies in
914 our country against a subsidized industry like that? How do
915 we use your budget to restore shipbuilding capacity in this
916 country and all the componentry that goes into it? How do we
917 do that?

918 Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, ma'am. I would say that my
919 focus is on building warships, and the quality, the
920 sophistication of the ships we build is unmatched by any
921 nation in the world. But it is important that we get to the
922 capacity issue, and that is why getting to the 313-ship fleet

923 is so important to me as the CNO.

924 Ms. KAPTUR. Well, you also have many smaller vessels,
925 Admiral. You have vessels that carry ammunition, and you are
926 leasing those vessels now. They weren't built here. And I
927 don't see the Department as fully conscious of the threat
928 that is out there, particularly from China, in using every
929 tool we have in order to restore our waning capability on the
930 seas for all types of vessels.

931 Admiral ROUGHEAD. Mr. Secretary, do you want to take
932 that?

933 Mr. WINTER. If I could, ma'am, first of all, in terms
934 of the leased vessels, we are reducing our dependency on
935 those leased vessels. We are down from 22 leased vessels
936 down to 17 at this point in time. These are short-term
937 leases, under 5 years, and they really represent an
938 opportunity, if you will, to surge and to be able to bring
939 into support roles vessels that are not currently being
940 manufactured for which we do not have a good economic
941 argument for manufacturing the full-time ownership of.

942 We are putting a lot of effort into investing in those
943 capabilities that provide the U.S. shipbuilding industry with
944 the ability to produce ships at lower cost, and this comes by
945 way of everything from contractual arrangements with the
946 individual yards to install a lot of technology which is
947 available elsewhere outside the United States for the most

948 part. That does assist us in terms of our surface
949 combatants. And in cases where that technology can be
950 applied to yards that support multiple applications--and
951 unfortunately there is only one of those yards right now,
952 major yards, that is a Masco facility in San Diego which
953 builds both Jones Act ships as well as logistics support
954 ships for us--there is value that they are able to accrue
955 both to their commercial endeavors as well as to their
956 activities for the Navy.

957 Ms. KAPTUR. Well, Mr. Secretary, do you monitor where
958 the subcontracts go? For example, if a ship is taken to
959 China, and the front half is whacked off and something is
960 welded on the back, do you monitor your subcontracts to do
961 everything possible to make sure that everything is done in
962 this country rather than shipped somewhere else?

963 Mr. WINTER. On all of our ships, most definitely,
964 ma'am.

965 Ms. KAPTUR. What about the electronics?

966 Mr. WINTER. The electronics is the same thing. All of
967 the modifications to our ships are all done, they are all
968 managed and appropriately assessed by the Navy organizations
969 that have the responsibility for management.

970 Ms. KAPTUR. Are they made in this country, sir?

971 Mr. WINTER. Excuse me?

972 Ms. KAPTUR. Are they made in this country?

973 Mr. WINTER. Every ship in the Navy register, all of our
974 combatants are.
975 Ms. KAPTUR. All of the vessels under your command are
976 made in this country, every single component?
977 Mr. WINTER. Outside, not every single component, ma'am,
978 but the vast majority of them are. The vast majority of the
979 components are.
980 Ms. KAPTUR. Well, I would appreciate a letter from you,
981 from your Department, that summarizes for me where you think
982 the challenges are to retain that production capacity in this
983 country.
984 Mr. WINTER. I would be pleased to do that, ma'am.
985 Ms. KAPTUR. All right. I wanted to ask General Conway,
986 thank you very, very much for your service.
987 What percent of the marines under your command are
988 serving a third tour or more in combat in Iraq? Do you know
989 that number?
990 General CONWAY. No, ma'am, I don't. I take surveys
991 every time I hold a town hall, and of the audiences there
992 routinely, 60 to 70 percent will have deployed. I will ask
993 for a second and a third time or even a fourth time, and a
994 fifth time I will ask for a show of hands. So I will say
995 increasingly we have three-time deployers, but I would have
996 to get the exact percentage for you.
997 Ms. KAPTUR. I would be very interested, and in the

998 trend, General. I am very interested in the trend if that is
999 increasing, which I think it is.
1000 General CONWAY. But the one thing, ma'am, I would
1001 explain to you is that unlike the other services, we will
1002 serve about a 3-year tour in the operational forces. And
1003 then we will have our marines and our officers go to what we
1004 call a B billet, and it will be there for about 3 years, and
1005 then they will come back to the operating forces. So we
1006 don't have some of the people that spend 7, 8, 9 years in the
1007 operating forces consecutively to roll up some of these large
1008 numbers.
1009 Now, some of those folks are starting to come back
1010 because we have been at this so long. This summer we are
1011 going to see some people come back, I think, that maybe left
1012 the operating forces in 2004, 2005, and we will have to see
1013 what the impact is on that for our retention.
1014 Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Chairman, my time has probably expired,
1015 but I did want to ask the General if he could--
1016 Mr. MURTHA. I wanted to end this before the votes
1017 because there is a series of votes. So we will go to Mr.
1018 Rothman.
1019 Ms. KAPTUR. Could I ask the General to provide for the
1020 record, Mr. Chairman, the issue of urban warfare training in
1021 U.S. cities by the Reserves, the Marine Reserves is an issue
1022 that has hit our community directly, and it was very

1023 troublesome what happened. I would like to know from you
1024 whether this is happening in Active forces anywhere in our
1025 country, if urban warfare training is occurring in U.S.
1026 cities, and what are the conditions for that, or whether it
1027 is just happening on the Reserve side.
1028 General CONWAY. No, ma'am. It happens with the Active
1029 forces. It has been happening since the mid-1980s almost
1030 without interruption or without any incident. So I was a
1031 little bit surprised to see the one happen as it did in Ohio.
1032 Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you.
1033 Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Rothman.

1034 RPTS MERCHANT

1035 DCMN HERZFELD

1036 Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1037 Gentlemen, thank you for your very distinguished service
1038 to our country. The Marine Corps has many officers who have
1039 never been deployed on a Navy ship, I have been told. Is
1040 that true?

1041 General CONWAY. Increasingly, sir, that is true.

1042 Mr. ROTHMAN. Does that disturb you?

1043 General CONWAY. Immensely.

1044 Mr. ROTHMAN. And with regards to that issue, as well as
1045 the lack of training for amphibious landings, does this new
1046 budget address that; and if so, how, please?

1047 General CONWAY. Sir, it does indirectly. And it
1048 transcends just amphibious operations. We are not doing
1049 live-fire maneuver exercises anymore. We are not going to
1050 cold-weather training. We are not going to jungle training.
1051 The part of the budget that assists us in managing that and
1052 making it better is in growing the force.

1053 There is two reasons we wanted to grow the Marine Corps.
1054 One was to be able to facilitate our deployment-to-dwell.
1055 Second was to be able to provide relief in the process so we
1056 could spend more time with the families and more time doing
1057 training.

1058 Mr. ROTHMAN. And training for these other things?

1059 General CONWAY. Yes, sir, exactly. If we can get this
1060 deployment-to-dwell something more akin to 7 months deployed,
1061 14 months home, we can sustain that. We think we can do the
1062 training, and we think the families will be much happier.
1063 Mr. ROTHMAN. Very good. I only have a few minutes.
1064 There is this new issue of Farm Policy magazine, the
1065 March-April 2008 issue, which apparently contains a survey
1066 which was conducted jointly with the Center for a New
1067 American Security where they asked 3,400 officers holding the
1068 rank of major or lieutenant commander and above across all
1069 the services, Active Duty and retired general officers and
1070 field grade officers, about their views of the health of the
1071 military. And here are some troubling findings.
1072 They said that 60 percent of the U.S. military see the
1073 U.S. military as weaker today than it was 5 years ago; 60
1074 percent. And with regards to the Marine Corps in particular,
1075 the majority of the responses indicated that on a scale of 1
1076 to 10, 1 being no concern about readiness effectiveness and
1077 10 being extreme concern, the majority of the responses
1078 indicated a 7, indicating great concern about the health of
1079 the Marine Corps.
1080 Would any of you gentlemen wish to address this?
1081 General CONWAY. Well, since you left off with the
1082 Marine Corps, sir, I will start and say that I think I would
1083 probably be about a 6 or a 7 myself.

1084 Now, in terms of the capability of the force, we are
1085 much more capable than we were 5 years ago. We have more
1086 marines, we have more equipment, we have combat training.
1087 And I would be much more comfortable sending that force into
1088 a fight than I was leading the force into a fight in 2003.
1089 But the concern I think these people are representing is
1090 that our core competencies, which go well beyond
1091 counterinsurgency, are not being trained to, not being
1092 conducted these days, to make sure that we can go anywhere
1093 and do anything for this country.
1094 Mr. ROTHMAN. And that will be addressed to your
1095 satisfaction in your budget?
1096 General CONWAY. Sir, the budget will help, but what we
1097 actually need over time will be, again, more time spent at
1098 home. You can do that through growing the force. You can do
1099 that through reducing the requirement.
1100 Mr. ROTHMAN. Right.
1101 General CONWAY. If the requirement is reduced, and we
1102 are able to manage these deployment requirements more
1103 effectively with a larger force, then we will be back to
1104 doing those things, and we will be in much better shape as a
1105 result.
1106 Mr. ROTHMAN. And to the CNO, with regards to China, two
1107 questions. One was, if I wrote this down correctly, you
1108 questioned the credibility of the news report?

1109 Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes.

1110 Mr. ROTHMAN. Now, I am a lawyer by training. Are you
1111 refuting the accuracy of the news report?

1112 Admiral ROUGHEAD. The reference to the encounter in the
1113 Straits of Taiwan, I would refute that.

1114 Mr. ROTHMAN. Okay. Good. And with regard to the
1115 buildup of the Chinese submarine force, it seems like a
1116 considerable effort on their part. And I heard what you
1117 said, that this is their effort to protect their energy
1118 supplies, and they are doing this to be a regional power, but
1119 you did say with probability that they wish to become a
1120 global sea power as well. Does your budget that you are
1121 submitting to us address the challenges of this growing
1122 submarine fleet from the Chinese?

1123 Admiral ROUGHEAD. Our budget, sir, represents the
1124 balance that we must have in the fleet and the capabilities
1125 that we have. It does address our ability to operate as a
1126 global Navy and prevail.

1127 Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1128 Mr. MURTHA. Thank you very much. I have to say it is
1129 hard for me to believe that you are a 6 or a 7, Commandant.
1130 You are not working out, huh?

1131 The Committee is adjourned until 1:30.

1132 [Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee was
1133 adjourned.]

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SPEAKER LISTING
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